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1. SUMMARY: This case raises the questions whether Sec. 17(a) of 
--;;::::::-. 
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77q(a), and Sec. lO(b) of the --
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 u.s.c. 78j(b) (and Rule lOb-5 pro-
rnulgated thereunder) require proof of scienter in an injunctive pro-
ceeding brought by the Securities & Exchange Commission. - ---
2. FACTS: In February 1976 the SEC filed a complaint against eight 
defendants, including petr, alleging inter alia violations of the 
anti-fraud provisions of Sec. 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Sec. 
lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule lOb-5 in 
~ .... a,_f-:: -t-l-c./6... ,-~ a C.c;;,--P,'c.:f c-- -tL.. 
,--__p-e---la,__-f- qw.e-s.--h~ /e /¥- ~..e..- i'..- f/&Jc.-~;Q.tl?.(iW",-4 
:::r 
\ .... . 
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connection with the offer and sale of common stock of Lawn-A-Mat Chemical 
& Equipment Corp. (Lawn-A-Mat). (The applicable statutory provisions and 
regulation are included in the appendix attached hereto.) Petr, who had 
supervisory responsibility over the employees of a broker-dealer firm 
registered with the Commission, allegedly violated the aider and abetter 
provisions of the Securities Acts in that he knew or should have known 
the employees of the broker-dealer firm were making materially false and 
misleading representations in the offer and sale of Lawn-A-Mat stock, but 
failed to take steps to prevent or terminate the fraudulent activity. 
Following a three-day evidentiary hearing, the DC found that petr had 
violated Sec. 17(a), Sec. lO(b), and Rule lOb-S : it enjoined him from 
future violations of those provisions. The CA affirmed. 
3. CA DECISION: In reaching its decision, the CA held that neither 
( : Sec. 17(a) nor Sec. lO(b) requires a showing of scienter when the govern-
. "--" 
ment brings enforcement actions to enjoin violations of those sections. 
TheCA first examined Sec. lO(b) in light of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 
425 U.S. 185 (1976), which held that proof of scienter 1s a necessary 
element in a private damage action under Sec. lO(b). It noted that Ernst 
explicitly left open the question whether scienter would be required in 
future injunction actions. 425 U.S. at 194 n. 12. It concluded that 
allegations and proof of negligence alone will suffice for injunctive 
relief under that Section. 
The CA examined the factors relied on by this Court in Hochfelder: (1) 
the language of Sec. lO(b): (2) the legislative history of the 1934 Act: 
and (3) the relationship of Sec. lO(b) to the other express civil 
remedies and the effect of a scienter requirement on the overall 
statutory scheme of the securities laws. The CA rejected the contention 
that Hochfelder's analysis of the language of Sec. lO{b) should apply 
c 
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with equal force to the question whether scienter is a requisite element 
in a government injunction action. After noting that different courts 
have construed the language of Sec. lO(b) differently, it examined the 
legislative history and purpose of the section. It reasoned that (1) a 
negligence standard should be applied in a government enforcement action 
because such actions are brought to provide maximum protection for the 
investing public, as contrasted with the purpose of private damage 
actions which are brought to obtain monetary relief for individual in-
vestors, (2) Sec. 2l(d) indicates that scienter was not intended to be 
required in SEC injunction actions ~/ and (3) the rejection of a 
scienter requirement for SEC injunction actions is consistent with the 
overall enforcement scheme of the securities acts. 
The CA then noted that it follows a fortiori from its holding with 
respect to the scienter requirement of Sec. lO(b) that scienter is not a 
requisite element of a government enforcement action to ·enjoin violations 
of Sec. 17(a). After observing that other circuits are divided on the 
issue whether Hochfelder should apply to actions brought under Sec. 
noted 
17(a), theCA 2Ahat it had previously determined unequivocally that 
scienter is not required in such an action as a result of the absence 
j/ 
"TheCA also noted that when Sec. 2l(d) was replaced by 
Sec. 2l(e) in 1975, Congress expressly indicated its approval of 
the approach taken by the CA 2 in not requiring a showing of 
scienter for injunction actions brought under Sec. lO(b): 
'Private actions frequently will involve more parties and more 
issues than the Commission's enforcement action, thus greatly 
increasing the need for extensive pre-trial discovery. In 
particular, issues related to matters of damages, such as 
scienter, causation, and the extent of damages are elements not 
required to be demonstrated in a Commission injunctive action.'" 
(Citation omitted) (Emphasis in original). S. R. Rep. No. 75, 
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1975). 
c 
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in Sec. 17(a) of any terminology comparable to the words "manipulative or 
deception" "device" or "contrivance" which the court found persuasive in 
Hochfelder. SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, 1026-28 (2d Cir. 1078). 
4. CONTENTIONS: Petr contends the CA's holding that scienter is not 
required under Sec. lO(b) conflicts with the interpretation of that 
section adopted by the CA 5 in SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1333 (5th 
Cir. 1978) and that its interpretation of Sec. 17(a) conflicts with the 
CA 7's interpretation of that section in Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 
554 F.2d 790, 795-796 (7th Cir. 1977). Petr notes that here the CA 2 
found the language of Sec. lO(b) alone is not determinative of the issue 
and thus resort to legislative history and purpose is proper. The CA 2 
also held that the policy considerations underlying the securities acts 
clearly reflect that a negligence standard should be applied in govern-
ment enforcement actions. By contrast, the CA 5 on Blatt held that dis-
cussion of the language of Sec. lO(b) in Hochfelder conclusively demon-
strates that scienter is a necessary element in government enforcement 
actions. It further stated that the language of the section was suffi-
ciently clear to be controlling notwithstanding considerations of public 
policy. The conflict between the CA 2 and CA 7 with respect to the 
appropriate interpretation of Sec. 17(a), according to petr, is equally 
apparent. 
Petr next contends the decision below raises significant and re-
curring problems. These are: (1) Does this Court's analysis and holding 
in Hochfelder under Sec. lO(b) and Rule lOb-S apply to SEC injunctive 
proceedings? (2) Are the language and history of Sec. lO(b) dispositive 
of the issue, or do arguments of policy and purpose control? and (3) 
~) Should Sec. 17(a) be read in harmony with Hochfelder? 
5. DISCUSSION: The issues presented are certworthy and the case 
- 5 - ' . 
( · suitable for review. In his response, the SG recommends t~is Court grant 
review in light of the importance of the issues, the extraordinary amount 
of time expended in litigating them, and the disagreement among the lower 
courts. 
C ..~
There is a response. 
10/3/79 
CMS 




Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933: 
It shall be unlawful for any person in the 
offer or sale of any securitie~ . . 9Y .t~e use of any 
means or instruments of transportation or 
communication in . interstate commerce or by the 
use of the mails, directly or indirectly -
• • 
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice 
to defraud, or • 
(2) to obtain money or property by means of 
any u~true statement of a material fact or any 
omission to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in the light 
of the circumstances under which they were 
made, not misleading, or 
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or 
course of business which operate$ or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser." 
Section lO(b) of the Securities Excpange Act of 1934: 
.. lt lshall be unlawful for any person, dire~tly 
or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the 
mails. or of any facility of any national securities 
exchange -
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the 
purchase of sale of any security registered on a 
national securities exchange or any security not 
so registered, any manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance in contravention of such 
rules and regulations as the Commission may 
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest or for the protection of investors." 
•• • -·· ···.-- ..... _ .. _-""!!~""!.,.....-
Rule lOb-S: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly 
or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the 
mails, or of any facility of any national securities 
exchange. 
(I) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice 
to defraud, 
(2) to make any untrue statement ~f a 
material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, 
in the light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading, or 
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course 
of business which operates or would operate as a 
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security." 
Court -
Argued ................... , 19 .. . 
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.A~~ t.,vr The question 1n this intere-s U'Flgcase- is w~her the sE.g. ~ 
ne~d prove scie~er in a proceeding for an injunction under § 10(b) ~~ 
~f the 1934 Act and §17(a) of the 1933 Act. Some of the difficulty~ ~r 
"--' 
with the case is that it presents the question with respect to both 
statutory provisions, so any answer must harmonize the two. This 
memo will examine the language and legislative history of each 
section, in turn. 
I 
In my view, your opinion for the Court in~nst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 4 25 U.S. 1 85 ( 1 976) , should control the disposition of 
this case with respect to § 1 0 (b) of the 193 4 Act. That opinion 
------------------expressly reserved the quest ion pres en ted here. Id. , at 19 4 n. 1 2. 
Hochfelder focused on the statute's use of "manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance" as reflecting Congress' intent to require 
cienter to make out a violation of the provision. 
'--
The opinion also 
drew support for that posit ion from the admittedly sketchy 
2. 
legislative history of § 10(b). There is no reason to depart now 
from the analysis in Hochfelder. 
The SEC, however, attempts to distinguish this case, arguing 
that Hochfelder involved a damage suit under an implied right of 
action, while this suit is for an injunction under § 21 (d) of the 
1934 Act. The SEC relies heavily on Justice Goldberg's opinion in 
~C v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 3 75 U.s. 180 ( 1 963), which 
involved an equitable action under the Investment Advisers Act of 
1940. The Court in Capital Gains ruled that the Commission did not ------
have to establish intent to deceive in order to obtain an injunction 
compelling a registered investment adviser to disclose to his clients 
the fact that he had just purchased shares in the corporation that he 
·.,as touting to the clients. The opinion quotes a treatise for the 
proposition that "'Fraud has a broader meaning in equity [than at 
law] and intention to defraud or to misrepresent is not a necessary 
::::::::::n ::~~e:nt al:t3i.onsT:: ::: :::u::o:: it:i:quci:sye. for a similar~ 
~-1~ 
I believe that Capital Gains is distinguishable from the I .-- •1/f./ 
instant case. The statutory provision in Capital Gains -- § ~6 of ~.- ~ 
the Investment Advisers Act banned "any • practice ••. which~ 
operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective l ~ 
client." This language contrasts fairly sharply with the terms of ~ ~~ 10(b), especially in the Investment Advisers Act's focus on practice~~ 
that "operate" as a fraud. In addition, Capital ,Gains interprets the ~1 .Hf 
legislative history of the Investment Advisers Act to support its ~IJ~j 
.nterpretation, while Hochfelder has already parsed the record of § ~ 
10(b) to impose a scienter requirement. 
3. 
The SEC also presents policy considerations on its behalf. 
Of course, Hochfelder held that there is no reason to look at policy 
when the language and statutory history are clear. In any event, the 
Commission stresses the broad remedial purposes behind the 1934 Act 
and the different nature of injunctive remedies as opposed to damages 
liability that was at issue in Hochfelder. Although there may be 
some superficial appeal to the SEC's argument here, it ~eems fatuous 
1-L :iC ~H --d·. ~ 
at this point in our history to view injunctive proceedings under the '~~ 
----~--------------~--------~~----~-------~ 
securities laws as anything other than punitive. There can be no ~ 
doubt that protection of the public is a substantial purpose behind 
such suits. Similarly, however, there is no doubt that injunctive 
proceedings have serious negative effects on the targets of the 
~~----~------------------,----------------------------------------... 
injunctions. The amicus brief for the Securities Industry 
Association points out that under § 15(b) of the 1934 Act, 
administrative sanctions may be imposed on a broker-dealer if either 
(1) he has willfully violated the securities laws, or (2} an 
injunction has been entered against him. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b). Amicus 
argues that unless scienter is required for injunctive proceedings, § 
15 (b) sanctions may be levied against broker-dealers without any 
showing of willful misconduct. This, amicus concludes with 
some J it only force, would violate the clear intent behind § 1 5 (b) that 
apply to intentional wrongdoing. 
CA2 relied in substantial part on the amendment of § 21(d} 
of the 1934 Act in 1975. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d). The provision 
authorizes an injunction "[w]henever it shall appear that a 
person is engaged or is about to engage in acts or practices 
constituting a violation of this chapter ••• " When it was revised 
4. 
in 1975, the Senate Report contrasted injunctive proceedings with 
damage actions: "In particular, issues related to matters of 
damages, such as scienter, causation and the extent of damages, are 
elements not required to be demonstrated in a Commission injunctive 
action." s. Rep. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1975) (emphasis 
in original) • The CA found this statement a compelling indication 
that Congress placed no intent requirement in § 1 0 (b) injunctive 
proceedings. I disagree. Section 21(d) states that an injunction is ? '2_1&1.} 
~ 
available to stop "acts or practices constituting a violation of thi~
chapter." It is a procedural provision, not a substantive one. 
Thus, unless the challenged acts are independent violations of the 
substantive securities law, gratuitous remarks in the legislative 
'listory of a revision of a procedural provision cannot establish a 
'--
different standard for finding a violation. 
II. 
The analysis of § 17(a) of the 1933 Act seems more difficult 
to me. The language of the statute states: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer 
or sale of any securities ... 
" ( 1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to 
defraud, or 
" ( 2) to obtain money or property by means of any 
untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state 
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading, or 
5. 
" ( 3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or 
course of business which operates or would operate as a 
fraud or deceit upon the purchaser." 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a}. 
The analysis of Hochfelder would seem to apply to§ 17(a}(1), which 
uses the key terms "device, scheme or artifice to defraud." Those 
~ If) 6 
terms ~clearly convey the idea of scienter. At a somewhat lower level --- ~ 
of certainty, § 17(a) (2) might be read in a similar way. The act of 
"obtain [ ing]" money might be seen to include an element of intent, 
although I must concede the provision might also be interpreted to 
include negligent as well as intentional acts. With respect to § 
17(a) (3), however, there is no doubt in my mind: The language 
clearly reaches negligent as well as intentional misconduct. 
·1nfortunately, neither the CA nor the DC specified whether the petr 
in this case had violated a particular subsection of§ 17(a), so 
there is no way of pinpointing the provision in dispute here. 
There is a fairly strong basis for reading the subdivisions 
at issue here as independent provisions. In United States v. 
Naftalin, 441 u.s. 768 (1979), this Court refused to read a 
requirement in§ 17(a)(3) back into§ 17(a) (1}: 
"The short answer is that Congress did not write 
the satute that way. Indeed, the fact that it did not 
provides strong affirmative evidence that while impact upon 
a purchaser may be relevant to prosecutions brought under § 
17 (a) ( 3), it is not required for those brought under § 
17(a)(1). As is indicated by the use of an infinitive to 
introduce each of the three subsections, and the use of the 
conjunction 'or' at the end of the first two, each 
6. 
subsection proscribes a dis tinct category of misconduct. 
Each succeeding prohibition is meant to cover additional 
kinds of illegalities -- not to narrow the reach of the 
prior sections." Id., at 773-774 (footnote omitted). 
There is a spirited dispute in the briefs over the 
significance of the deletion of the word "wilfully" from the final 
version of§ 17(a). Primarily for the reasons offered by the amicus 
brief of the Securities Industry Association at pp. 17-18, I was not 
especially impressed with the significance of that deletion. 
Nevertheless, I do believe that there is no basis for reading a 
scienter requirement into the language of§ 17(a) (3). Consequently, -
I believe this Court eithe~ould have to determine whether the facts 
0f the case make out a violation of that provision [the less-
@ 
preferred course] , or remand for that determination by the DC [my 
preferred course]. 
I have not had time to reflect fully on the impact that such 
a reading of § 17(a) (3) will have. Clearly, the SEC would then pitch 
much of its enforcement effort toward that statute, but the provision 
is limited to those selling securities, which is one of the reasons 
why § 10(b) was added in 1934. As a result, a certain asymmetry of 
enforcement policy would develop, where negligent fraud by sellers of 
securities would be punishable while negligent fraud by buyers would 
not. This result has some intuitive appeal, since there is a 
stronger "fiduciary"-type relationship between a professional 
securities seller and the public. In any event, Congress can always 
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ERNST & ERNST v. HOCHFELDER 199 
185 Opinion of the Court J Cj - 0 G 
r i:.' D.t-lead, the Co ission would add a gloss to the operative 
language of he statute quite different from its com-
monly accepted meaning. See, e. g., Addison v. Hally 
Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U. 8. 607, 617- 618 (1944).10 
The argument simply ignores the use of the words "manip-
ulative," "device," and "contrivance"- terms that make 
unmistakable a congressional intent to proscribe a type of 
conduct quite different from negligence. 20 Use of the 
word "manipulative" is especially significant. It is and 
was virtually a term of art when used in connection with 
securities markets. It connotes intentional or willful 1 
conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by con-
trolling or artificially affecting the price of securities. 21 
In addition to relying upon the Commission's argu-
ment with respect to the operative language of the stat-
10 "To let general words draw nourishment from their purpose is 
one thing. To draw on some unexpressed spirit outside the bounds of 
the normal meaning of words is quite another. . . . After all, legisla-
tion when not expressed in technical terms is addressed to the com-
mon run of men and is therefore to be understood according to the 
sense of the thing, as the ordinary man has a right to rely on ordinary 
words addressed to him." Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 
322 U. S., at 617-618. See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the 
Reading of Statutes, 47 Col. L. Rev. 527,536-537 (1947). 
20 Webster's International Dictionary (2d ed. 1934) defines "device" 
as "[t]hat which is devised, or formed by design; a contrivance; an 
invention; project; scheme; often, a scheme to deceive; a stratagem; 
an artifice," and "contrivance" in pertinent part as "[a] thing con-
trived or used in contriving; a scheme, plan, or artifice." In turn, 
"contrive" in pertinent part is defined as "[t]o devise; to plan; to 
plot . .. [t]o fabricate ... design; invent ... to scheme ... . " 
The Commission also ignores the use of the terms "[t]o use or 
employ," language that is supportive of the view that Congress 
did not intend § 10 (b) to embrace negligent conduct. 
21 Webster's International Dictionary, supra, defines "manipulate" 
as "to manage or treat artfully or fraudulently; as to manipulate 
accounts . . . . 4. Exchanges . To force (prices) up or down, as 
by matched orders, wash sales, fictitious reports ... ; to rig ." 
--1 ~ . .. · ..... 
' ! 
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CHAMBE RS O F 
THE CHIEF JUSTIC E 
-
jlttprtmt QJotttt of tl!t ')Jltrittb $>hdt.s 
~asfringLltt. ;ID. <4. 2 !T.SJ~ ;3 
March 3, 1980 
Re: 79-66 - Aaron v. S.E.C. 
Dear Potter: 
/ 
I find here, as with a half dozen of this week's cases, 
that there are wide disparities in the basis of a majority 
even when five or more agree on the result. 
In this case you may recall my view that the Court of 
Appeals decided the issue of scienter when it was not 
necessary to do so. (a) The District Court found scienter 
but gratuitously went on to say "negligence of one may 
suffice . "; (b) the Court of Appeals did not disturb 
the finding and indeed relied on it in part. (See page 2la, 
App. to Pet. For Cert.) 
As I stated at Conference, the Court of Appeals opinion 
goes beyond the need for a holding that negligence alone is 
enough. For me, the issue I thought we had is not here. I 
therefore conclude to take that position, in which I am 
joined by no one as of now. In these circumstances, I 
would remand to require the Court of Appeals to reconsider 
its holding in light of there being no need to pass on the 
scienter issue on this record. 
Bill Brennan would affirm across the board; five votes 
(without mine) were to vacate and remand but not on the same 
basis as I think we should do so. In light of this, I 
would prefer to have you assign and my narrower ground for 
remanding can be stated in co currence. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to the Conference 
To. •rne 
Mr. 
Mr. Ju 1 t ....- _.. 
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~ SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATE:! ? No.79--6e 
1 ~ "' Peter E. Aaron, Petitioner, l • On Writ of Certiorari to the ;It' J:;; t C<_ --(/~itc-
• }- ' . . v. United States Court of Appeal~ 
~ Secunt1es an.d .Exchange for the Second Circuit. 
Comm1sswn. 
[April -, 1980] 
MR. JusTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue in this case is whether the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (Commission) is required to establish 
scienter as an element of a civil enforcement action to enjoin 
violations of§ 17 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act); 
§ 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) 1 
and Commission Rule 10b-5 promulgated under that section 
of the 1934 Act. 
I 
When the events giving rise to this enforcement proceeding 
~~h 







occurred, the petitioner was a managerial employee at E. L. 
Aaron & Co. (the firm) , a registered broker-dealer with its 
principfil office in New York City. Among other responsibili-
ties at the firm, the petitioner was charged with supervising 
the sal~s made by its registered representa.tives and maintaining 
the so-?alled "due diligence" files for those securities in which 
the firm ~erved as a market maker. One such security was 
the cwnri1on stock of Lawn-A-Mat Chemical & Equipment 
Corp. ,dLawn-A-Mat) , a company engaged in the business of 
selling lawn care franchises and supplying its franchisees with ~ ~ 
products and equipment. L -~'~ ~ _ r "·. 
Between November 1974 and September 1975, two re -~ 
tered representatives of the firm, Norman Schreiber and Do, ~ 
~rj,~ 
79-66--0PINION 
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aid Jacobson, conducted a sales campaign in which they 
repeatedly made false and misleading statements in an effort 
to solicit orders for the purchase of Lawn-A-Mat common 
stock. During the course of this promotion, Schreiber and 
Jacobson informed prospective investors that Lawn-A-Mat 
was planning or in the process of manufacturing a new type of 
small car and tractor, and that the car would be marketed 
within six weeks. Lawn-A-Mat, however, had no such plans. 
The two registered representatives also made projections of 
substantial increases in the price of Lawn-A-Mat common 
stock and optimistic statements concerning the company's 
financial condition. These projections and statements were 
without basis in fact, since Lawn-A-Mat was losing money 
during the relevant period. 
Upon receiving several complaints from prospective inves-
tors, an officer of Lawn-A-Mat informed Schreiber and Jacob-
son that their statements were false and misleading and 
requested them to cease making such statements. This 
request went unheeded. 
Thereafter, Milton Kean, an attorney representing Lawn-
A-Mat, communicated with the petitioner twice by telephone. 
In these conversations, Kean informed the petitioner that 
Schreiber and Jacobson were making false and misleading 
statements and described the substance of what they were 
saying. The petitioner, in addition to being so informed by 
Kean, had reason to know that the statements were false, 
since he knew that the reports in Lawn-A-Mat's due diligence 
file indicated a deteriorating financial condition and revealed 
no plans for manufacturing a new car and tractor. Although 
assuring Kean that the misrepresentations would cease, the 
petitioner took no affirmative steps to prevent their recur-
rence. The petitioner's only response to the telephone ca:lls 
was to inform Jacobson of Kean's complaint and to direct him 
to communicate with Kean. Otherwise, the petitioner did 
nothing to prev.ent the two registered representatives under 
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his direct supervision from continuing to make false and 
misleading statements in promoting Lawn-A-Mat common 
lltock. 
In February 1976, the Commission filed a complaint in the 
District Court for the Southern District of New York against 
the petitioner and seven other defendants in connection with 
the offer and sale of Lawn-A-Mat common stock. In seeking 
preliminary and final injunctive relief pursuant to § 20 (b) 
of the 1933 Act and § 21 (d) of the 1934 Act, the Commission 
alleged that the petitioner had violated and aided and abetted 
violations of three provisions-§ 17 (a) of the 1933 Act, § 10 
(b) of the 1934 Act, and Commission Rule 10b- 5 promul-
gated under that section of the 1934 Act.1 The gravamen of 
the charges against the petitioner was tha.t he knew or had 
reason to know that the employees under his supervision were 
engaged in fraudulent practices, but failed to take adequate 
steps to prevent those practices from continuing. Before 
commencement of the trial, all the defendants except the 
petitioner consented to the entry of permanent injunctions 
against them. 
Following a bench trial, the District Court found that the 
petitioner had violated and aided and abetted violations of 
§ 17 (a.) , § 10 (b) , and Rule 10b-5 during the Lawn-A-Mat 
sales campaign and en.ioined him from fut11re violations of 
these provisions.2 The District Court's finding of past viola-
tions was based unon its factual finding that the petitioner 
had intentionally failed to discharge his supervisorv respon-
sibility to stop Schreiber and Jacobson from making state-
1 The Commission also charged the petitioner anrl tlm•e other defendnnts 
with violations of the registrati0n provisions of &§ 5 (a ) , (c) of the 1933 
Act , 15 U. S. C. §§ 77e (a), (c) (1976) . The District Court found that 
the petitioner had violat ed these provisions and enjoined him from future 
violations. The Court of Appeals affirmed this holding. and the petitioner 
has not. challenged this portion of the Court of Appea l's decision. 
2 The opinion of the District Court is reported in F ed . Sec. L . R ep. 
(eeH), at 1['96,04l; 
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ments to prospective investors that the petitioner knew to be 
false and misleading. Although noting that negligence a.Ione 
might suffice to establish a violation of the relevant provisions 
in a Commission enforcement action, the District Court con-
cluded that the fact that the petitioner "intentionally failed 
to terminate the false and misleading statements made by 
Schreiber and Jacobson, knowing them to be fraudulent, is 
sufficient to establish his scienter under the securities laws." 
As to the remedy. even though the firm had since gone bank-
rupt and the petitioner was no longer working for a broker-
dealer, the District Court reasoned that injunctive relief 
was warranted in light of "the nature and extent of the viola-
tions ... , the [petitioner's] failure to recognize the wrongful 
nature of his conduct and the likelihood of the [petitioner] 
repea.ting his violative conduct." 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the 
judgment. SEC v. Aaron, 605 F. 2d 612. Declining to reach 
the question whether the oetitioner's conduct would su ort 
a fin mg of scienter, the Court of Appeals held i~Rtead that 
wllen the Commission is seekin '·Injunctive relief "proof of 
neg 1gence a one wil snffige" to esteblish violation of 
§ 17 (a), § 10 (b). and Rnle 10b-5. /d., at 619. With rega.rd 
to § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5. the Court of Apoeals noted that 
this Court's opinion in Ernst & Ernst v. H ochfelder, 425 U. S. 
185, which held that an allegation of scienter is necessarv to 
·state a private cause of action for damages under § 10 (b) 
and Rule 10b-5. had expressly reserved the question whether 
scienter must be alleged in a suit for injunctive relief brought 
by the Commission. /d., at 194. n. 12. The conch1sion of the 
Court of Appeals that the scienter requirement of Hochfelder 
does not apply to Commission enforcement proceedings was 
said to find sunnort in the language of § 10 (b). the legislative 
history of the 1934 Act. t;he relationship between § 10 (b) and 
the overall enforcement scheme of the securities laws, and the 
"compelling distinctions between ,private ·actions and govern-
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ment injunction actions." 3 For its holding that scienter is 
not a necessary element in a Commission injunctive action to 
enforce § 17 (a) , the Court of Appeals relied on its earlier 
decision in SEC v. Coven, 581 F. 2d 1020. There that court 
had noted that the language of § 17 (a) contains nothing to 
suggest a requirement of intent and that, in enacting§ 17 (a), 
Congress had considered a scienter requirement. but instead 
"opted for liability without willfulness, intent to defraud. or 
the like." ld., at 1027-1028.4 Finally, the Court of Appeals 
affirmed the District Court's holding that, under all the facts 
and circumstances of this case. the Commission was entitled 
to injunctive relief. 605 F. 2d. at 62:3.---624. 
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the federal 
courts as to whether the Commission is required to establish 
scienter-an intent on the part of the defendant to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud 5-as an element of a Commission 
I 
5 The Court of Apprals observed that its previous drcisions had required 
scirnter in private damagr actions tmder § 10 (b) rvrn before this Court's 
drcision in the Hochfelder casr, but also had "uniformly .. . hrld that the 
language and history of the section did not requirr a showing of scienter in 
an injunction action brought b~' the Commis~ion." 605 F . 2d, a.t 620-621. 
This distinction had been prcmisNl on t11e fact that the two types of suits 
under § 10 (b) advance different goals: actions for damngrs nre designed 
to provide compensation to individual investors, whereas suits for injunctive 
relirf serve to provide maximum protection for the investing public. In 
the presrnt case, t.lw Court. of Appeals, relying on its reasoning in previous 
cnses, concluded that "[i]n view of the policy considerations underlying 
the securities acts, . .. the increasE'd effE'rtivE'ness of govrrnm~>nt, en-
forcement actions predicated on a showing of n~>gligence alone outweigh [s] 
the danger of potential harm to those enjoined from violating the securi-
ties laws." !d., at 621. 
o~. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals gave any indica-
tion of which subsection or subsections of § 17 (a) of the 1933 Act the 
petitioner had violated. 
5 The term "scienter" is used throughout this opinion, as it was "in 
Emst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, at 193, 11. 12, to refer to "a 
ment.al state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or drfraud." We 
have nq occasion here to address the question, reserved in Hochfelder, 
19-66-0PINION 
6 AARON v. SEC 
enforcement action to enjoin violations of § 17 (a),6 § 10 (b), 
and Rule lOb- 5.7 444 U. S. 914. 
II 
The two substantive statutory provisiOns at issue hereY 
are § 17 (a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77q (a), and § 10 
(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78j (b). Section 17 (!) , 
which applies only to sell!(rs,.provides: 
-;,It shall be--unlawful for any person in the offer or sale 
of any securities by the use of any means or instruments 
of transportation or communication in interstate com-
merce or by the use of the ma.ils, directly or indirectly-
" ( 1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to de-
fraud, or 
" (2) to obtain money or property by means of any 
untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or 
" ( 3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course 
of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or 
deceit upon the purchaser." 
Section 10 (b) , which applies to both buyers and sellers, ....___.. ./ 
ibid., wlwthcr, under some circumi;tances, scienter may abo include reck-
lrss behavior. 
G Com]JHrC' , e. g., the present case, and SEC v. Coven, S81 F . 2d 1020 
(CA2 197b) (ticienter not required in Commi~:sion enforcement action 
under §17(a )(1)- (3)) , with Steadman v. SEC, 603 F . 2d 1126 (CAS 
1979) (srient er required in Commission enforcement a.ction under § 17 
(:1)( 1), but not under§ 17 (a )(2)- (3)) , and with SEC v. Cenco, 436 F . 
Supp. Hl:~ (ND Ill . 197i) (sciente r required in Commission enforcement 
action under§ 17 (a) (1) - (3)) . 
7 Compan·, e. g., the present case, and SEC v. World Radio Mission, 
Inc. , 544 F . 2d 535 (CAl 1976) (scienter not required in Commission 
enforcrment. action under § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5) , with SEC v. Blatt, . 
.'1-83 U. S. 1325 (CAS 1978) (scienter required in Commission enforcement 
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makes it "unlawful for any person . . . [ t] o use or employ, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security ... any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contraven-
tion of such rules and regulations as the Commission may 
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or 
for the protection of investors." Pursuant to its rulemaking 
er this section, the Commission promulgated 
Rule lOb-5, hich now provides: 
s all be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, 
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any 
national securities exchange, 
''(a) To employ any device, scheme, artifice to defraud, 
"(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact 
or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
" (c) To engage in any a.ct, practice, or course of busi-
ness which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit 
upon any person, 
"in connection with the sale or purchase of any security." 
17 CFR ~ 240.10b-5 (1979). 
The civil enforcement mechanism for these provisions con-
sists of both express and implied remedies. The express 
remedy is a suit by the Commission f r 'n · unctrverelief. 
Sec 10n 20 ( o t e Ac, . S.C.§ 77t (b), provides: 
''Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any 
person is engaged or about to engage in any acts or prac-
tices which constitute or will constitute a violation of the 
provisions of this subchapter [e. g., § 17 (a)], or of any 
rule or regulation prescribed under the authority thereof, 
it may in its discretion, bring an action in any district 
court of the United States ... to enjoin such acts 
or practices, and upon a proper showing a permanent or 
temporary injunction or restraining order shall be granted 
without bond." 
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Similarly, § 21 (d) of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78u (d), 
authorizes the Commission to seek injunctive relief whenever 
it appears that a person "is engaged in or is about to engage 
in any acts or practices constituting" a violation of the 1934 
Act, [e. g., § 10 (b)], or regulations promulgated thereto, 
[e. g., Rule 10b-rf,\J, ancl requires a district court "upon a 
proper showing" to grant injunctive relief. 
The other facet of civil ~nforcement is a 12rivate cause of 
action for money damages. This remedy, unlike the Com-
mission injunctive action, is not expre~ authorized by stat-
ute, but rather has been jud!cially implied. See Ernst & Ernst 
v. H ochfeza;;::-;upra, :t25'U:" S., at 19'6"-197. Although this 
Court has repeatedly assumed the existence of a1"Wmplied 
cause of action under § 10(9,1 and Rule 10b-5, see Ernst & 
Ernst v. Hochfelder, supra;'f3lue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug 
Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 730; Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United 
States, 406 U. S. 128, 150-154; Superintendent of Insurance v.
1 
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U. S. 6, 13, n. 9, it has not had 
occasion to address the question whether a private cause of 
action <'Xists under § 17 (a). See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor 
Drug Stores, supra, at 733, n. 6. 
l 
The issue here is whether the Commission in seeking injunc-
tive relief either under § 20 (b) for violations of § 17 (a), or 
under ~ 21 (d) for violations of § 10 (b) or Rule 10b-5, is 
required to establish scienter. Resolution of that issue could 
depend upon (1) the substantive provisions of § 17 (a), § 10 
(b) , and Rule 10b-5, or (2) the statutory provisions author-
izing injunctive re-lief "upon a proper showing," § 20 (b) and 
§ 21 (d). We turn to an examination of each to determine 
thP extPnt to which they may require proof of scienter. 
A 
In determining whether scienter is a necessa.ry element of 
a violation of § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5, we do not write qn a 
clean slate. Rather, the starting point f or our inquiry is 
Ernst & Ernst v. Hocl~felder, 425 U. S. 185, a case in which 
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tbe Court concluded that a private cause of action for damages 
·will not lie under § 10 (b) and Rule lOb- 5 in the absence of 
·an allegation of scienter. Although the issue presented in the 
present case was expressly reserved in H ochfelder, id. , at 193, 
n. 12, we nonetheless !!!_Ust_Ee guided by the reasoning of that 
decision. ~ - -
~ conclusion in Hochfelder that allegations of simple 
negligence could not sustain a private cause of action for 
damages under § 10 (b) a·nd Ru1e 10b- 5 rested on several 
grounds. The most important was the plain meaning of the 
language of § 10 (b). It was the view of the Court that the 
terms "manipulative," "device/ ' and "contrivance"-whether 
given their commonly accepted meaning ot tead as terms of 
art- quite clearly evinced a congressional intent to proscribe 
only "knowing or intentional misconduct.'" Id., at 197-199. 
This meaning, in fact , was thought to be so unambiguous as 
to suggest that "further inquiry may be unnecessary." /d., 
at 201. 
The Court in H ochfelder nonetheless found additional sup-
port for its holding in both the legislative history of § 10 (b) 
and the structure of the civil liability provisions in the 1933 
and 1934 Acts. The legislative history, though "bereft of any 
explicit explanation of Congress' intent," contained "no indi-
cation ... that § 10 (b) was intended to proscribe conduct not 
involving scienter." /d., 201- 202. Rather, as the Court 
noted, a spokesman for the drafters of the predecessor of 
§ 10 (b) described its function as a "catch-all clause to prevent 
manipulative devices." /d., at 202. This description, as well 
as various passa~~;es in the Committee Reports concerning the 
evils to which the 1934 Act was directed, evidenced a purpose 
to proscribe only knowing or intentional misconduct. More-
over, with regard to the structure of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, 
the Court observed that in each instance in which Congress 
had expressly created civil liability, it had specified the stand-
ard of liability. To premise civil liability U11der § 10 (b) ori 
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merely negligent conduct, the Court concluded, would run 
counter to the fact that wherever Congress intended to accom-
plish that result, it said so expressly and subjected such actions 
to significant procedural restraints not applicable to § 10 (b). 
!d., a.t 206-211. Finally, since the Commission's rulemaking 
power was necessarily limited by the ambit of its statutory 
authority, the Court reasoned that Rule 10b-5 must likewise 
be restricted to conduct involving scienter.8 
In our view the' rationale of HJ2.ch[elder ineluctabl:t: le~ds 
to he conclusion that scienter is an ele ent of a viol · of 
§ 1~ -5, regardless of t..he identity of the 
plamtiff or the nature of the ""i-elief SoUght. Two of the three 
fa"Ctors I~i"nllodijelae;:::_the language of § 10 (b) 
and its legislative history-are applicable whenever a viola-
tion of § 10 (b) or Rule 10b-5 is alleged, whether in a private 
cause of action for damages or in a Commission injunctive 
action under§ 21 (d).9 In fact, since Hochfelder involved an 
implied cause of action that was not within the contemplation 
of the Congress that enacted § 10 (b), id., at 196, it would be 
quite anomalous in a case like the present one, involving as it 
does the express remedy Congress created for § 10 (b) viola-
tions, not to attach at least as much significance to the fact 
that the statutory language and its legislative history support 
a scienter requirement. 
The Commission argues that H ochfelder, which involved a 
8 The Court in Hochfelder also found support. for its conclusion as to 
the scope of H.ule lOb-5 in the fact that the administrative history revealed 
that "when the Commission adopted the Rule it was intended to apply 
only to activit.;es that involved scienter." 425 U. S., at 212. 
9 The third factor-the structure of civil liability provisions in the 193:l 
and 1934 Acts-obvicusly has no applicability in a case involving injunc-
tive relief. It is evident, however, that the third factor was not deter-
minative in Hochfelder. Rather, the Court in Hochfelder clearly indicat·ed 
that the language of the statute, which is applicable here, was sufficient, 
standing alone, to support the Court's conclusion that scienter is required'. 
~n a private damage action 1;1:.11d'er po (b,). 42.5 U. S., at 201, 
). 1 ' z.,, .,, 
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private cause of action for damages, is not a proper guide 
in construing § 10 (b) in the present context of a Commission 
enforcement action for injunctive relief. We are urged instead 
to look to SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U. S. 
180. That case involved a suit by the Commission for injunc-
tive relief to enforce the prohibition in § 206 (2) of the Invest-
ment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. § 80b-6, against any 
act or practice of an investment adviser that "operates as a 
fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client." The 
injunction sought in Capital Gains was to compel disclosure 
of a practice known as "scalping," whereby an investment 
adviser purchases shares of a given security for his own 
account shortly before recommending the security to inves-
tors as a long-term investment, and then promptly sells the 
shares at a profit upon the rise in their market value following 
the recommenda.tion. 
The issue in Capital Gains was whether in an action for 
injunctive relief for violations of § 206 (2) 10 the Commission 
must prove that the defendant acted with an intent to defraud. 
The Court held that a showing of intent was not required. 
This conclusion rested upon the fact that the legislative his-
tory revealed tha.t the "Investment Advisers Act of 1940 ... 
reflects a congressional recognition 'of the delicate fiduciary 
nature of an investmen_t \f~visory relationship,' as well as a 
to The statutory provision ~orizing injunctive relief involved in the 
Capital Gains case was § 209 (e) of the Investment Advi::;ors Act, 15 
U.S. C.§ 80b-9 (e), which provides in relevant part: 
"Whenever it shall appear to the Commis::;ion that. any person has en-
gaged, is engaged, or is about to engage in any act or practire constituting 
a violation of any provision of this subchapter, or of any rnle, regulation, 
or order hereunder, ... it may in its discretion bring an action in the 
proper distt·ict court of the United States ... to enjoin such act:; or 
practices and to enforce compliance with this subchapter or any rule, 
regulation, or order hereunder. Upon a proper showing that Fuch person 
has engaged, is engaged, or is about to engage in any such act or prac-
tice, ... , a permanent or temporary injunction or decree or restraining 
order shall be granted without bond." 
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congressional intent to eliminate, or at least to expose, all 
conflicts of interest which might incline an investment ad-
viser-consciously or unconsciously-to render advice which 
was not disinterested." 375 U. S., at 191-192 (footnote 
omitted). To require proof of intent, the Court reasoned, 
would run counter to the expressed intent of Congress. 
The Court added that its conclusion was "not in derogation 
of the common law of fraud." !d., at 192. Although recog-
nizing that intent to defraud was a necessary element at com-
mon law to recover money damages for fraud in an arm's-
length transaction, the Court emphasized that the Commis-
sion's action was not a suit for damages. but rather a suit for 
an injunction in which the relief sought was the "mild pro-
phylactic" of requiring a fiduciary to disclose his transactions 
in stocks he was recommending to his clients. !d., at 193. 
The Court observed that it was not necessary in a suit for 
"equitable or prophylactic relief" to establish intent, for 
"[f]raud has a broader meaning in equity [than at law] and 
intention to defraud or to misrepresent is not a necessary 
element." ld., quoting De Funiak, Handbook of Modern 
Equity 235 (2d ed. 1956). Moreover, it was not necessary, 
the Court said, in a suit against a fiduciary such as an invest-
ment adviser, to establish all the elements of fraud that would 
be required in a suit against a party to an arm's-length trans-
action. Fina.lly, the Court took cognizance of a "growing 
recognition by common-law courts that the doctrines of fraud 
and deceit. which developed around transactions involving land 
and other tangible items of wealth are ill-suited to the sale 
of such intangibles as advice and securities. and that. accord-
ingly, the doctrines must be adapted to the merchandise in 
issue." !d., at 194. Unwilling to assume that Congress was 
unaware of these developments at common law. the Court 
concluded that they "reinforce [ d]" its holding that Congress 
had not sought to require a showing of intent in actions tCl> 
enjoin violations of § 2U6 (~). lld., at 19"5, 
.. 
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The Commission argues that the emphasis in Capital Gains 
upon the distinction between fraud at law and in equity should 
guide a construction of § 10 (b) in this suit for injunctive 
relief.11 We cannot, however, draw such guidance from 
Capital Gains for several reasons. First, wholly apart from 
its discussion of the judicial treatment of "fraud" at law and 
in equity, the Court in Capital Gains found strong support in 
the legislative history for its conclusion that. the Commission ----:;v 
need not demonstrate intent to enjoin practices in violation _ • H 
of § 206 (2). By contrast, as the Court in Hochfelder noted, (f~· 1 
the legislative history of§ 10 (b) poinU; towar~ a scienter A_~ 
requirement. Second, it is quite clear that the anguage in 
question in Capital Gains, "any ... practice . . . w ich operates 
as a fraud or deceit," (emphasis added) focuses not on the 
intent of the investment adviser, but rather on the effect of 
a particular practice. Again, by contrast, the Court in H och-
felder found that the language of § 10 (b)-particularly the 
t rrms "manipulative," "device." and "contrivance."-c]early 
refers to "knowing or intentional misconduct." Finally, 
insofar as Capital Gains involved a statutory provision regu-
lating the special fiduciary relationship between an invest-
ment adviser and his client, the Court there was dealing with 
u The Commission finds further support for its interpretation of § JO 
(b) as not requiring proof of scienter in injunctive proceedings in the 
fa ct that Congress was expressly informed of the Commission 's interpre-
tation on two occasions when significant. amendments to the securities 
laws were enacted-the Securities Act. Amendment;; of J975, Pub. L. No. 
94-29, 89 Stat. 97, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. 
L. No. 95-21 3, 91 Stat. 1495-and on each occaEion C0ngress left the 
administrative interpretation undisturbed. See S. Rep. No. 94-75, 94th 
Cong .. l st Sess., 76 (1976); H. R. Rep. No. 95-640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 
10 (1977) . But, since the legislative consideration of those statutes was 
addressed principally to matters other than that at issue here , it. is our 
view that the failure of Congress to overturn the Commission's interpre-
tation falls far short of providing a. basis to support a. construction of 
§ 10 (b) so clearly at odds with it:s plain meaning and legi:slative history. 
See SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 119- 121. 
' . 
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a situation in which intent to defraud would not have been 
required even in a common-law action for money damages.12 
~ection 10 (b), unlike the provision at issue in Capital Gains, 
applies with equal force to both fiduciary and nonfiduciary 
transactions in securities. It is our view, in sum, that the t r 
controlling precedent here is not Capital Gains, but rather 
H ochfelder. Accordingly, we conclude that scienter is a neces-
sary element of a viola.tion of § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5. 
In determining whethesf scienter is a necessary ele-
ment of a violation of § 17 (a) there is less precedential 
authority in this Court to · s. But the controlling prin-
ciples are well settled. Though cognizant that "Congress 
intended securities legislation enacted for the purpose of 
avoiding frauds to be construed 'not technically and restric-
tively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes,' " 
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, supra, at 151, quoting, 
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, supra, at 195, the 
Court has also noted that <(generalized references to the 
'remedial purposes' " of the securities laws "will not justify 
reading a provision 'more broadly than its language and sta.tu-
tory scheme reasonably permit.'" Touche Ross & Co. v. 
Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 578, quoting, SEC v. Sloan, 436' 
U. S. 103, 116. Thus, if the language of a provision of the 
securities laws is sufficiently clear in its context and not at 
odds with the legislative history, it is unnecessary "to exam-
ine the additional considerations of 'policy' ... that may have 
12 The Court, in Capital Gaius concludt>d: "Thus, even if we were to 
agree with the courts below that. Congress had intended, in effect, to 
codify the common law of fraud in the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, it 
would be logical to conclude that CongretiS ccdified the common law 
'renwdially' as the co'Urts had adapted it to the prevention of jraudule11t 
securities transactions by fid'Uciaries, not 'technically' a:; it hws traditionally 
been applied in damage suit:; between partie:; to arm's-length tran:;actions· 
jpvolving land and ordi)iJ:m:y chattels."' 37,5 U. S_:., at 195 (emphwsis added). 
.. 
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influenced the lawmakers in their formulation of the statute." 
Ernst & Ernst v. H ochfelder, supra, at 214, n. 33. 
l 
The language of § 17 (a.) strongly suggests that Congress 
contemplated a scienter requirement under § 17 (a) (1), but 
not under § 17 (a.)(2) or § 17 (a)(3). The language of § 17 
(a)(1), which makes it unlawful "to employ any device, 
scheme, or artifice to defraud," plainly evinces an intent on 
the part of Congress to proscribe only knowing or intentional 
misconduct. Even if it be assumed that the term "defra.ud" 
is ambiguous, given its varied meanings at law and in equity, 
the terms "device," "scheme," and "artifice" all connote know-
ing or intentional practices.18 Indeed, the term "device," 
which a.lso appears in § 10 (b), figured prominently in the 
Court's conclusion in H ochfelder that the plain meaning of 
§ 10 (b) embraces a scienter requirement.14 !d., at 199. 
By contrast, the language of § 17 (a)(_2), which prohibits I 
any person from o6taining money or property "by means of 
any untrue s~atement .of a ~aterial fact or a.I:lY omission to 
state a matenal fact," IS devoid of any suggestiOn whatsoever 
of a :::;cieuter requirement. As a well-known commentator has 
noted, "[t]here is nothing on the fa.ce of Clause (2) itself 
which smacks of scienter or intent to defraud." III__b._;hoss, 
Secnrities Regulation 1442 (2d ed. 1961). In fact, this Court 
in H ochfelder pointed out that the s;milar language of Rule 
10b-5 (b) "could be read as proscribing . . . any type of 
material misstatement or omission ... that has the effect of 
13 Webster's International Dictionary (2d ed. 1934) defines (1) "de-
vice" as "rtlhat which is devh;rd, or formrd by drsign; a contrivance; an 
invention; project; scheme: often, a scheme to deceive; a stratagrm: an 
artJice," (2) "scheme" as "[a] plan or program of something to be done; 
an cnterpri~:;c; l1 project: as, a businc::;s scheme [, or] [a] crafty, unethical 
pro,iect," and (3) "artifice" as l1 "[c]raft.y device; trickery; abo, an 
artful stratngrm or trick; artfulness; ingeniousness." 
14 In addition, thr Court in Hochfelde1' noted that the term "to employ," 
which appears in both § 10 (b) and § 17 (a)(1), is ":suwortive of the 
virw that Congress did not intend § 10 (b) to embrace negligent condud .. "· 
425' U. S., at 199, n .. 20 .. 
' . 
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defrauding investors, whether the wrongdoing was intentional 
"r not." 425 U. S., at 212. 
Finally, the language of · 17 (a) (3 under which it is 
unlawful for any person "to 1 · any transaction , prac-
tice, or course of business which operates or would operate as 
a fraud or deceit," (emphasis added) quite plainly focuses 
upon the effect of particular conduct on members of the 
investing public, rather than upon the culpability of the per-
son responsible. This reading follows directly from Capital 
Gains, which attributed to a similarly worded provision in 
§ 206 (2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 a meaning 
that does not require a "showing [of] deliberate dishonesty as 
a condition precedent to protecting investors." 375 U. S. , at 
200. 
I It is our view, in sum. that the language of§ 17 (a) requires scienter under§ 17 (a)(1) , but not under~ 17 (a)(2) or§ 17 (a) (3). Although the parties have urged the Court to adopt a 
uniform culpability requirement for the three subparagraphs 
of § 17 (a) , the language of the section is simply not amenable 
to such an interpretation. This is not the first time that this 
Court ha5 had occasion to emphasize the distinctious among 
the three subparagraphs of § 17 (a). In United States v. 
Naftalin, 441 U. S. 768, 774, the Court noted that each sub-
paragraph of § 17 (a) "proscribes a distinct category of mis-
conduct. Each succeeding prohibition is meant to cover addi-
tional kinds of illegaiities-not to narrow the reach of the 
prior sections." (Footnote omitted .) Indeed, since Congress 
drafted § 17 (a) iu such a manner as to compel the conclu-
sion that scienter is required under one subparagraph but not 
under the other two, it would take a very clear expression in 
the legislative history of congressional intent to the contrary 
to justify the conclusion that the statute does not mean what 
it so plainly seems to say. 
We find no such expression of congressional intent in the 
legislatiYe history. The provisions ultimately enacted as 
79-66-0PINION 
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§ 17 (a) had their genesis in § 13 of identical bills introduced 
simultaneously in the House and Senate in 1933. H. R. 4314, 
73d Coug., 1st Sess. (Mar. 29, 1933); S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st 
Sess. (Mar. 29, 1933).1 5 As originally draJted, § 13 would 
have made it unlawful for any person 
"willfully to employ any device, scheme. or artifice to 
defraud or to obta.in money or property by means of any 
false pretense, representation, or promise, or to engage 
in any transaction, practice, or course of business ... 
which operates or would operate as a fraud upon the 
purchaser." 
Hearings on these bills were conducted by both the House 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee and the Senate 
Banking and Currency Committee. 
The House and Senate Committees reported out different 
versions of § 13. The Sena.te Committee expanded its ambit 
by including protection against the intentionally fraudulent 
practices of a "dummy," a person holding legal or nominal 
title but under a moral or legal obligation to act for someone 
else. As amended by the Senate Committee, § 13 made it 
unlawful for any person 
"willfully to employ any device, scheme, or artifice or to 
employ any 'dummy,' or to act as any such 'dummy.' with 
the intent to defraud or to obtain money or property by 
means of any false pretense, representation , or promise, 
or to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of 
business . .. which operates or would operate as a fraud 
upon the purchaser .... " 
See S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 27, 1933); S. Rep. 
No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 4-5 (1933). The House Com-
mittee retained the original version of § 13, except that the 
word "willfully" was deleted from the beginning of the provi-
1 " During the House hearings, H. R. 5480 was substitu ted for H. R. 
4314. .See H. R 5480, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (May 4, 1933). 
' . 
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sion.1 " See H. R. 5480, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., § 16 (a) (May 4, 
1933). It also rejected a suggestion that the first clause, "to 
employ any device, scheme, or artifice," be modified by the 
phrase, "with intent to defraud." See ibid.; Federal Securi-
ties Act: Hearings on H. R. 4314 before the House Committee 
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 146 
(1933). The House and Senate each adopted the version of 
the provision as reported out by its Committee. · The Con-
ference Committee then adopted the House version with a 
minor modification not relevant here, see H. R. Conf. No. 152, 
73d Cong., 1st Sess., 12, 27 ( 1933), and it was later enacted 
into law as§ 17 (a) of the 1933 Act. 
The Commission argues that the deliberate elimination of 
the language of intent reveals that Congress considered and 
rejected a scienter requirement under all three clauses of 
§ 17 (a). This argument, however, rests entirely on inference, 
for the Conference Report sheds no light on what the Con-
ference Committee meant to do about the question of scienter 
under § 17 (a).11 The legislative history thus gives rise to 
the equally plausible inference that the Conference Committee 
concluded that (1) in light of the plain meaning of § 17 
(a)(1), the language of intent-"willfully" and "with intent 
to defraud"-was simply redundant, and (2) with regard to 
Hl The Hou:;e Committee ahm renumbered § 13 as § 16 (a), divided the 
provision into three subparAgraphs. and modified the lnngiiHge of the 
~ccond subparagraph in a manner not relevant here. See H . R 5480, 73d 
Cong .. M Sess., § 16 (a) (May 4, 19:m. 
17 Although explaining that the "dummy" provision in the Senate bill 
was deleted from § 13 becau~E' it was substituted in mcdifi ed form el~·e­
where in the statute, H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 152, 73d Cong ., 1st Se~s . , 27 
(193:3), the Conference Report contained no explanation of why the Con-
frrencc CommittE>e acquiesced in the decision of the Hou~r to delete the 
word '·willfully" from § 13. That the CommittE'e faiiE>d to exp1ain why it 
followed the House bill in this rrgard is not in it:;elf significant, sincr the 
C'r•nference Report, by it::; own terms. purported to di;;cu ~s only the 
"ditferl'nces between the House bill and the substitute agreed upon by thP 
confPrE>es." !d., at 24. The deletion of the wcrd "willfully" was common 
to both the Hot\Se bill und the CorlferencE> sub;;titiAte. 
. ,~ . s. 
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§ 17 (a)(2) and § 17 (a.)(3), a. "willful[ness]" requirement 
was not to be included. It seems clear, therefore, that the 
legiElative history, albeit ambiguous. may be read in a manner 
entirely consistent with the plain meaning of § 17 (a)." In 
the absence of a. conflict between reasonably plain meaning 
a.nd legislative history, the words of the statute must preva.il. 1u 
c 
l 
There remains to be determined whether the proviSions 
authorizing injunctive relief, § 20 (b) of the 1933 Act and 
§ 21 (d) of the 1934 Act, modify the substantive provisions 
at issue in this case so far as scienter is concerned. 
The language a.nd legislative history of ~ 20 (b) a.nd § 21 (d) 
both indicate that Congress intended neither to add to nor 
detract from the requisite showing of scienter under the 
substtmtive provisions at issue. Sections 20 (b) a.nd 21 (d) 
provide that the CommiEsion may seek injunctive relief when-
ever it appears that a person "is engaged in or r is l about to 
eng·age in any acts or practices" constituting a violation of the 
1933 or 1934 Acts or regulations promulgated thereunder and 
that, "upon B nroper showing," a district court shall grant the 
injl'nction. The elements of "a proper showing" thus include, 
1s ThP C0mmit:sicn, in further o·uppcrt of its view that scienter is not 
required under any of the subpant!!'rHphs of § 17 (a) , points out that 
§ 17 (a) wa::; patterned upon New York's Martin Act, N. Y. Gen. Bus. 
Law §§ 352-35:3 (1921), and that the New York Court. of AJ)peals had 
con~trued the Martin Act. as not requiring a :;bowing of ~cientcr as a 
prcdirate for in.iunctiw relief by the New York Attorney General. 
People , .. Federated Radio Corp., 244 N. Y. 33, 154 N. E. 655 (1926).
1 
But, in the nb8ence of any indicntion that Congres:; was even aware of the 
Federated Radio d. <'ri:::ion, much less that it approved ef that decision, it 
cannot fairly be inferred that Congre1'R intended not only to adopt the 
language of the : \1artin Act, but also a state judicial interpretation of 
t.hat. statutr at odd:; with the plain meaning of the language Congres:; en-
acted a:; § 17 (a) (1) . 
19 Since the language and legislative history of § 1i (a) arc clispo~itivc, 
we have no occasion to address the "policy" argument~ advanced by the 
parties. See Ernst & Ernst "· Hochjelder, 425 U. S. 185, 214, n. 3iL 
' . 
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at a minimum, proof that a person is engaged in or is about 
to engage in a substantive violation of either one of the Acts 
or of the regulations promulgated therf'u ncler. Accordingly. 
whPn scienter is an element of thf' substantive violation sought 
to be f'njoined. it must be proven before an injunction may 
issue. But with respect to those provisions such as ~ 17 (a) 
(2) and ~ 17 (a) (3). which may bf' violated f'ven in the absence 
of scienter. nothing on the facr of ~ 20 (b) or ~ 21 (d) pur-
ports to impose an independent requirement of scif'nter. And 
there is nothing in the legislative history of either provision to 
suggest a contrary legislative intent. 
This is not to say. however. that scienter has no bearing at 
all on whether a district court should enjoin a person violating 
or about to violate~ 17 (a) (2) or§ 17 (a)(3). In cases where 
the Commission is seeking to enjoin a person "about to engage 
in acts or practices which . . . unll constitute" a violation of 
those provisions. the Commission must establish a sufficient 
evidentiary predicate to show that such future violation may 
occur. See SEC v. Commonwealth Chemical Co., 574 F. 2d 
90, 98-100 (CA2 1978) (Friendly. J.); III L. Loss. supra, at 
1976. An important factor in this regard is the degree of 
intentional wrongdoing evident in a defendant's past conduct. 
See SEC v. Wills, 472 F. Supp. 1250. 1273-1275 (DC 1978). 
Moreover, as the Commission recognizes, a district court may 
consider scienter or lack of it as one of the aggravating or 
mitigating factors to be taken into account in exercising its 
equitable discretion in deciding whether or not to grant 
injunctive relief. And the proper exercise of equitable dis,. 
cretion is necessary to ensure a "nice adjustment and recon-
ciliation between the public interest and private needs. 11 
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 329. 
III 
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we hold that the 
Commission is required to establish scienter as an element of 
a civil enforcement action to enjoin violations of § 17 (a) (1) 
0 • 
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of the 1933 Act, § 10 (b) of the 1934 Act, and Rule 10b-5 
promulgated under that section of the 1934 Act. We further 
hold that the Commission need not establish scienter as an 
element of an action to enjoin violations of § 17 (a)(2) and 
§ 17 (a)( 3) of the 1933 Act. The Court of Appeals affirmed 
the issuance of the injunction in this case in the misappre-
hension that it was not necessary to find scienter in order to 
eupport an injunction under any of the provisions in question. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, 
and the case is remanded to the court for further proceedings 
eonsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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